Empathy and the Virtue of Compassion
Benjamin E. Schramm
Abstract
The basic moral premise of the so-called Golden Rule (“Do unto others as you would have them do unto you”) is that we ought to treat others how we ourselves wish to be treated. It seems that in order for one to abide by this deontic maxim, one must possess a healthy degree of empathetic concern for others’ well-being, which minimally involves some cognitive awareness of another’s emotional experience, which results in a similar emotional experience. However, it is not clear what role empathy ought to play in the moral life. Assuming a virtue ethical framework–according to which, the aim of the moral life is to cultivate a virtuous character, which in turn enables one to live a good life–this paper explores the relationship between empathy and the virtue of compassion, defined here as the fixed and stable disposition to properly empathize with the suffering of others, which in turn compels one to act for the benefit of the one(s) suffering. Because compassion is the mean between the deficiency of narcissism–having too little empathy, by which one lacks concern for the well-being of others–and the excess of hyper-empathy–having too much empathy, by which one loses oneself in the emotional experiences of others–having the virtue of compassion entails that one understands what it is to properly apply empathy in different situations. Therefore, following Simmons (2014), the present author argues that a healthy amount of empathetic concern is both necessary and sufficient to properly care for others’ well-being. The paper concludes by considering some objections against the moral importance of empathy.
Introduction
If a rich man donates to charity only to pay less in taxes, we might say that his motives were misplaced even if his actions were good. If someone pretends to be compassionate only for the sake of appearing so, it seems difficult to say that they are truly behaving well. Examples like this show that being a good person involves more than simply performing good actions; for if one performs a good action for selfish reasons, then one is not really behaving well, but only mimicking a virtuous character. Being a good person requires one’s mind and will to be in the right state in addition to doing good things; it includes empathizing with someone and having the right kinds of emotions and motivations.
What is Empathy?
But what exactly is it to empathize? According to Simmons (2014), “To empathize typically involves perceiving that another being is experiencing some particular emotion (or feeling) and, as a result of this perception, experiencing an emotion similar to what the other being is experiencing” (p. 99). So at a minimal level, empathy involves some cognitive awareness of another’s emotional experience, and this cognitive awareness results in a similar emotional experience for the one empathizing. A more recent definition along these same lines has been put forward by Camassa (2023):
Empathy… is an intentional psychological process that allows us to tune into others and thereby understand and feel with a variable degree of approximation mental states and emotions that we deem consonant with those experienced by them, while maintaining a sense of self-other differentiation. (p. 331)
An “intentional psychological process” is a cognitive state that is about or directed towards something else or, in the case of empathy, someone else. So, for example, when one empathizes with another feeling sad, they feel some degree of sadness because of the sadness they perceive the other feeling. In other words, empathy can be described as a kind of intentional emotional state. Emotion is a modern, nineteenth-century category (see Dixon, 2003). Beyond it designating a kind of mental state or feeling, the present author follows Aquinas in defining emotions in terms of their intentional objects (see Summa Theologiae II.1.22-48). This is to say that our emotional faculties are activated by external objects through cognition, and as such are always intentional. The problem with the rich man in the opening example is precisely that in donating to charity, he is not empathizing with the benefactors, as his emotional faculties are not activated by their suffering; his motivation for donating is pure self-interest.
Now empathy is clearly some kind of emotion, but it is difficult to say what kind because its intentional object is the emotional experience of another. It might be that different levels of empathy correspond to the emotions towards which they are directed. That is, while empathy itself might be morally neutral, it gains some sort of moral status based on its intentional object (more on this below). Indeed, Camassa adds that “Empathy… comes in degrees (it can be more or less strong and more or less accurate in its understanding and feeling of the other’s mental states),” and that “Different people have different empathy levels (they are not, in other words, all equally skilled)” (2023, p. 331). This implies not only that people can empathize in different ways and to various degrees, but also that applying empathy in the appropriate situations is a skill that can be developed via habituation and practice. So empathy can be defined as an intentional psychological process directed at another’s emotional experience, which results in a similar emotional experience.
Virtue Ethics
So far so good—but exactly what role empathy ought to play in the moral life will depend on one’s preferred theory of normative ethics. Henceforth, the present author will assume the theory of virtue ethics, according to which the aim of the moral life is to build a virtuous character, which in turn enables one to live a flourishing life. Virtue ethics is preferable for two reasons. First, because virtue ethics goes beyond merely performing one’s duty (as in deontology) or bringing about desirable consequences (as in consequentialism), it circumvents the concern that one could be a good person merely by performing good actions, but without actually being virtuous. Second, the aim of virtue ethics is not merely to direct actions, but to teach one how to live a good life as a whole.
Above all, virtue ethics is grounded in the fact that humans are habit-forming creatures who become more and more disposed to make similar choices. Some habits make people better, while others make people worse–and this is the line between virtue and vice. Briefly, a virtue is a fixed and stable disposition of the will that enables a person to choose to act well, for the right reasons, without any serious internal opposition. Annas (2011) helpfully compares virtues to practical skills. For instance, if one has the practical skill of cooking, then one will know how to operate in the kitchen regardless of whether there is a recipe in front of them. An experienced cook may abide by certain guidelines in certain circumstances; but what to actually cook here and now is contingent on the present circumstances, not universal cooking laws. In the same way, having the virtue of, say, compassion, entails that one knows what it is to be compassionate and how to apply it in different situations. As Annas says,
Virtue is a lasting feature of a person, a tendency for the person to be a certain way. It is not merely a lasting feature, however, one that just sits there undisturbed. It is active: to have it is to be disposed to act in certain ways. And it develops through selective responses to circumstances. (2011, p. 8)
Justice
Now because no one is a mere individual–in that all individuals are naturally and ineluctably linked to others through the bonds of family, tribe, nation, etc.–almost every action one undertakes has some bearing on other persons. In other words, all human actions are performed as part of some society or other, whose greater good is always the common good of all its members. As such, every act one undertakes bears on the virtue of justice, which is the firm disposition of the will to render the other (another part in the same greater whole) his or her due. The just person ensures that the other receives even his particular good, so that together they might better enjoy the common good.
Compassion
When another lacks a good that is due to them, this triggers a feeling of compassion in the just person. In his Rhetoric, Aristotle describes compassion (misericordia) as “a feeling of pain at an apparent evil, destructive or painful, which befalls one who does not deserve it, and which we might expect to befall ourselves or some friend of ours.” (cited in Saunders, 2015, p. 121) And because compassion’s object is the lack of a due good (injustice), it denotes being so affected that one moves to alleviate the distress of another. Aquinas agrees with Aristotle that compassion has the following two elements: (i) sharing the pain of at least one other; and (ii) a desire to act for the benefit of the one(s) suffering. As Ryan (2010) puts it,
The compassionate person feels sorrow for and tries to dispel the distress of the other as if it were one’s own… At this level, concern for the other’s welfare is couched in terms of one’s own well-being or, in other words, of vulnerability to similar distress. Compassion is respect for the other that, like shame, has its grounding in respect for the self. (p. 161)
In this sense, compassion involves empathy even if it is not reducible to it.
Compassion and Degrees of Empathy
Given this, the virtue of compassioncan be aptly described as the fixed and stable disposition of the will that enables one to properly empathize with the suffering of others, at the appropriate times, which in turn compels one to act for their benefit. Seen this way, compassion is the mean between the deficiency of narcissism–having too little empathy, by which one lacks concern for the basic well-being of others–and the excess of hyper-empathy–having too much empathy, by which one loses oneself in the emotional experiences of others. Simmons explains,
A mature and virtuous empathy must aim for the middle. On the one hand, one must be willing to intellectually and emotionally identify, connect, and relate with others. At the same time, one must also caution against certain dangers of excessive empathy. One must maintain awareness of oneself as distinct from others. … One must also preserve a sense of her own moral importance, to protect against servitude or over-sacrificing. (2014, p. 110)
So while empathy itself is not a virtue, it can be virtuous insofar as it contributes to one’s compassion.
Ryan adds that for Aquinas, there is a further level of compassion, one that “goes beyond sorrow in oneself for another’s plight as if it were ‘one’s own’ since this is still distinct from the suffering of another. Compassion moves towards identifying oneself with the other in their distress” (2010, p. 162). Dodds (1991) clarifies that in this instance, “One suffers not so much “with” the other through a kind of sympathetic response as “in” the other by a sort of empathetic union.” (p. 339) Compassion can thus be described as an empathetic union with another through suffering, which is distinct from mere sympathetic union. Camassa puts the matter like this:
The most typical (and most powerful) potentiality of empathy is its capacity to make us step into the shoes of another, to make us understand another not from the outside, in a cold and detached manner, like a scientist describing the behavior of a particular animal, but, as it were, from the inside, in a hot and attached way. Thanks to empathy we wear the skin of the other—maybe only for a few moments, and in any case without losing the fundamental awareness of who we are—and take on a double-perspective: my own one, and that of the target of my empathy. (2023, p. 337)
In line with this understanding, Simmons suggests that the right amount of empathy involves both a cognitive and an affective component. In his words, “The cognitive component is the conscious recognition that another being is experiencing some emotion. The affective component is our experience of a similar emotion that results from this recognition” (2014, p. 99). Simmons distinguishes this notion from a “purely cognitive definition” of empathy, according to which “empathy is just the cognitive awareness of another’s internal states (e.g., thoughts, feelings…” (2014, p. 99)
Empathy as Necessary and Sufficient for Compassion
According to Davies (2003), one can discern an identifiable triadic structure in the act of compassion: (i) we are exposed to another’s distress (cognition), (ii) we feel moved by what we perceive (affective), and (iii) we take action to try to remedy their distress (volitional). (p. 18) “On that basis,” says Ryan, “I cannot truly be called compassionate if I am aware of, and moved by, another’s suffering but decide not to act… In that case, without the volitional or, conative element, it is simply pity.” (2010, p. 163) So compassion necessarily involves being so moved by another’s suffering that one chooses to act for their benefit. On this basis, Simmons argues that empathy is both necessary and sufficient to care for others’ well-being. Empathy is sufficient “when (a) one empathizes in particular with others’ concerns for their basic well-being and (b) one empathizes in the fullest sense of empathy,” which includes “both the cognitive and affective dimensions of empathy.” (2014, p. 98) Empathy is (typically, if not always) necessary because “When we feel concern for another’s suffering, we necessarily empathize with her insofar as we share in her feelings of concern for her pain or distress.” (2014, p. 98) This does not entail that we empathize with all of another’s feelings. For example, one may share in another’s feeling of concern without sharing in their feelings of, say, hopelessness or worthlessness. One might also feel concern for another who is not as concerned for their own well-being. In such instances, Simmons suggests that “our concerns in these instances may still count as empathy if we accept a broader sense of empathy which involves empathizing with how others ought to feel and not just how they actually feel.” (2014, p. 98)
Objections
Some ethcists argue that this sort of empathetic concern is not actually necessary for being an ethical person. Snow (2000) has appealed to the example of autistic individuals:
To see that empathy is not necessary for morality, consider that high-functioning autistics are capable of obeying moral rules, though many lack empathic feeling for others. They are able to comply with traditional moral prohibitions, and even to engage in prosocial helping behavior, though they do so in relatively empathic ways. This shows that compliance with moral norms need not entail a strong affective component. If so, empathy is not necessary for morality. (p. 74)
Even Simmons concedes that “many people (not just autistics) are capable of complying with moral norms (to help and not harm others) without feeling empathetic concern for others.” (2014, p. 105) Psychopaths are the prime example. However, he goes on to reiterate one of the central claims of virtue ethics, that the moral life “involves not only performing the right actions but also having the right inner states, including the right affective states.” (2014, pp. 105-106) So while a person lacking empathetic concern for others is still able to live a minimally morally acceptable life by performing good actions,
… there is a degree to which this person is not a fully ethical, flourishing, or good person because she lacks the proper emotional responses. Although she may treat others with respect, she doesn’t do so because she empathetically feels concern for their well-being. She ought not only to treat others with respect but also to do so because she feels concern for their well-being. (2014, p. 106)
Stocker (1997) gives the example of someone who visits his friend in the hospital not because he actually cares for his friend, but only because he has reasoned that visiting his friend is his moral duty. Although by visiting his friend in the hospital, he is technically doing the right thing, he lacks the empathy that a good friend ought to have.
But because ought implies can, it might seem unfair and even nonsensical to judge these sorts of individuals as falling short of an ethical ideal. For if some individuals are psychologically incapable of empathy, it seems difficult to say declare them morally blameworthy for failing to empathize with others. Simmons, sympathetic to this objection, suggests that “we ought to say that feeling empathetic concern for others is an essential part of being a fully ethical person for those who are capable of feeling empathetic concern for others, which includes most mature humans.” (2014, p. 106; emphasis mine)
Prinz (2011) argues that empathy is not actually useful for promoting ethical behavior. For one, it is conceivable that one may empathize with others while remaining unmotivated to help them. Simmons argues,
If, however, one empathizes specifically with others’ concerns for their well-being, then it is difficult to see how one could fail to have at least some motivation to help or not harm them. When one empathizes with another’s concerns, one experiences those concerns as the other experiences them: as worthwhile and mattering, such that one will want to help the other satisfy her concerns. (2014, pp. 106-107)
But the worry Prinz raises seems to be this: whether one is sufficiently motivated may well depend on how strongly one empathizes with another’s concerns, as well as the extent to which one’s concern for another do or do not conflict with one’s self-interest. So “An ethical person must empathize to the right degree with others’ concerns, such that she is sufficiently motivated to help or not harm others when appropriate, and she must find the right balance between her various other-focused concerns and self-concerns.” (2014, p. 107)
Batson (2011) goes further than Prinz, arguing that empathy-induced desires to help another person could possibly lead to immoral action, such as by putting the interests of that person above the interests of others in a way that is unfair or unjust. In support of his argument, Batson cites an experiment in which participants who empathized more with a terminally ill child were more willing to move them off a waiting list and into an immediate treatment group ahead of other children who either had been waiting longer for treatment or had more severe illnesses. In response, Simmons reminds us that any morally significant emotion (not just empathy) can be biased towards those one is most familiar with. However, like with any bias, there are means of minimizing empathetic bias. In any case, “When empathy leads one to favor another’s interest in a way that violates the principles of fairness and justice, it may be the case that one has failed to properly empathize with the needs of those who are being treated unfairly or justly.” (2014, p. 107) Simmons argues that this seems to be the case in the very experiment Batson cites.
Battaly (2011) contends that empathy lacks a number of properties essential to virtues, and should instead be classified as a skill. She argues that if empathy is to be considered a virtue, it must have some voluntary component, which is necessary for moral responsibility in general. This immediately rules out conceptions of empathy that are automatic and involuntary. According to Battaly, the one conception of empathy that involves voluntary control is perspective-taking. Yet because virtues are dispositions of the will–indicating what one would do under certain circumstances–while skills are abilities–indicating what one is able to do–Battaly maintains that even empathy as perspective-taking does not qualify as a virtue.
Simmons agrees with Battaly that virtues must be under our voluntary control, that virtues are dispositions indicating what we would do in certain circumstances, and that a virtuous person aims for what is morally good. However, he disagrees that empathy cannot have these features of virtues, especially empathy with others’ suffering or well-being. He writes, “The person who fails to feel concern for others’ well-being when there are appropriate opportunities to do so is not an empathetic person in the relevant sense. That is, this person is not good at feeling concern for others’ well-being when it is appropriate to do so.” (2014, p. 108) Additionally, a person with empathetic concern for others necessarily aims for the moral good because of their belief that helping others and not causing harm is good in itself. As Simmons puts it, “she cares for others’ well-being for their own sake. She does not want to help others simply for ulterior motives, such as rewards or reputation.” (2014, p. 108) Moreover, against Battaly, Simmons argues that “empathy need not involve complex perspective-taking” and that “more commonly it can occur simply when we observe affective cues in others’ behavior.” (2014, p. 109) He then proposes that we have some voluntary control over this kind of empathy because “it is within our control to pay closer attention to the affective cues in others’ behavior and language.” (2014: 109) Additionally, we have the ability to rationally deliberate about how and with whom we ought to empathize. For these reasons, Simmons maintains that empathy is indeed virtuous, and that a properly empathetic (compassionate) person “is motivated by the moral good and is disposed to feel concern for others’ basic well-being when appropriate opportunities arise.” (2014: 110)
In the end, Simmons seems justified in concluding that “Feeling empathetic concern for others’ well-being (1) gives one motivation to help others or not harm them, (2) it is essential to being a fully flourishing, ethical person and (3) it possesses essential characteristics of other moral virtues.” (2014: 110) In short, a healthy amount of empathetic concern is both necessary and sufficient to properly care for others’ well-being, and thereby cultivate the virtue of compassion, which will in turn drive one to act for the sake of justice.
Conclusion
This paper opened by considering the moral importance of having the right kinds of emotions and motivations in addition to performing right actions. Then building on Simmons (2014) and Camassa (2023), a minimal definition of empathy was introduced as a segway into exploring its possible role in the moral life, which heavily depends on one’s preferred theory of normative ethics. Because virtue ethics is agent-centered rather than action-centered, and concerned with how to live a good life as a whole, the present author prefers it to rival theories like deontology or consequentialism. After defining virtue as a fixed and stable disposition of the will that enables a person to choose to act well, for the right reasons, and without serious internal opposition, the virtue of justice was explored, followed by the virtue of compassion. Building on Aristotle, Aquinas, and Ryan (2010), it was found that compassion’s intentional object is injustice. Because of this, compassion involves both empathizing with the suffering of another as well as a motivational desire to act for the sufferer’s benefit. In terms of virtue ethics, the virtue of compassion was defined as the fixed and stable disposition of the will that enables one to properly empathize with the suffering of others, at the appropriate times, which in turn compels one to act for their benefit. With the help of Dodds (1991) and Ryan’s (2010) reading of Aquinas, compassion was properly distinguished from a mere sympathetic union with another as an empathetic union with another, which correspond respectively to Simmons’s (2014) cognitive and affective components of empathy. Then building on Davies’s (2003) triadic structure of compassion (cognition, affection, action), Simmons’s (2014) contention that empathy is both necessary and sufficient to care for others’ well-being was presented, and then defended against objections from Snow (2000), Pinz (2011), Batson (2011), and Battaly (2011). The present author concurs with the conclusions of Simmons (2014) and adds that empathy’s role in the moral life is, in the short term, to motivate altruistic behavior, and in the long term, to cultivate the virtue of compassion, which will contribute to living a good life as a whole, not just for the individual, but for the community at large.
So if a rich man donates to charity only to pay less in taxes, and not because he is compassionate towards the benefactors, we can indeed say that even though he did a good thing, he was not being a good person. His motives were misplaced because he did not donate to alleviate the suffering of the benefactors–even if that is a consequence of his donation–but only to benefit his own interests. The same goes for the one who pretends to be compassionate only for the sake of appearing so. As noted at the beginning, being a good person involves more than simply doing good things, like donating to charity; it requires one’s mind and will to be in the right state, having the right kinds of emotions and motivations, and above all, a healthy amount of empathy.
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Reflections 