Issue 02, Article 005

Philosophy of Gestalt Psychology and Insight Approach to Problem Solving

Pankaj Singh

Before Gestalt psychology developed into a fully-fledged school and theory, the seeds of Gestalt were planted in the minds of thinkers and scholars such as Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), Ernst Mach (1838-1916), Franz Brentano (1828-1919), Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), Christian von Ehrenfels (1859-1932), Oswald Kulpe (1962-1915), and Carl Stumpf (1848-1936). Kant’s philosophy was characterized by an emphasis on the unity of the perceptual act (Gomes,2014). Physicist Mach (1959), in his book The Analysis of Sensation, concluded that sensation, by the mechanism of organization in consciousness, creates qualities of the form (one of the translations of the word Gestalt). Von Ehrenfels (1937) wrote a study on “form characteristics” in response to Mach’s work. Through his study of melodies, he discovered that musical chords might be easily identified when moved to a different key, despite the fact that each note is different. As a result, he determined that music is an organized totality.

However, it was the phenomenological tradition that had a profound influence on how the gestalt was conceptualized. Brentano (1995) deemed Wundt’s psychology (Wundt is widely regarded as the founder of experimental psychology ((Butler-Bowdon, 2007)) and method of introspection to be forced and artificial. He revived the concept of intentionality, which he derived from scholastic philosophy. The concept of intentionality served as the cornerstone of the phenomenological tradition, which had a greater impact on the concept of gestalt. According to Brentano, intention is defined as “reference to the context, direction toward an object” (1874/1995, pp.88).

            Christian Von Ehrenfels, Carl Stumpf, and Edmund Husserl were among Brentano’s students who shaped the phenomenological tradition. Husserl is widely considered to be the founder of phenomenology. He was a key figure in the development of phenomenology. Husserl’s phenomenology was influenced by Brentano’s concept of intentionality, the idea that consciousness is always consciousness of something (Woodruff Smith, 2014). He was interested in elucidating the essence of human experience as gleaned from intuitive encounters with phenomena. In the Husserlian sense, a phenomenon referred to complete, meaningful experience rather than to the experience of fragments of consciousness. He desired to establish a link between experimental psychology and careful phenomenological investigation. He believed that phenomenology could be beneficial in this way for analyzing the implicit preconceptions and assumptions that guide psychological examination.

Carl Stumpf, another Brentano student, was instrumental in establishing the Gestalt Movement in psychology. Distinguishing Phenomena from mental function, he proposed the following presuppositions for Gestalt perception ((Stumpf 1939/2011,p.254)).

  • The possibility for detecting a relationship to be perceived.
    • The possibility of consciousness containing unnoticed content.
    • The distinction between phenomena and mental functions as heterogeneous contents of consciousness.

These presuppositions played a critical role in the development of Gestalt psychology. Brentano, Husserl, and Stumpf all agreed that the subject matter of psychology is an integrated psychological experience. They were also proponents of human science’s objectivity, but only in conjunction with a holistic approach. Three of Stumpf’s students fully realized the Gestalt movement into Gestalt psychology: Max Wertheimer (1880-1943), Wolfgang Köhler (1887-1967), and Kurt Koffka (1886-1941) .

Wertheimer (1912) believed that behaviorists were misusing terms such as stimulus and response. He conducted a series of experiments to ascertain the nature of the stimulus in order to gain a better understanding of human perception. Wertheimer observed an intriguing phenomenon relating to human perception through his experiments, which he dubbed the “phi phenomenon” (Steinman et al., 2000). The phi phenomenon is an optical illusion of “apparent movement” (Ash, 1998) that occurs when the visual field perceives movement in the absence of any stimulus movement. The phi phenomenon became a turning point in the gestalt movement and perception research. This established Wertheimer as a co-founder of Gestalt psychology. Köhler and Koffka, two of his long-standing gestalt theorists, served as subjects for the phi phenomenon.

Gestalt psychology became the study of the mechanism by which an organism acquires and maintains a meaningful, holistic perception of the chaotic world around it. Gestalt is a German term used in Gestalt psychology that has multiple English definitions, including shape, form, figure, and frame. However, the term Gestalt is frequently best defined by the well-known phrase “the whole is greater than the sum of its parts,” which is an incorrect translation, as Kurt Koffka intended “the whole is something other than the sum of its parts” (Koffka, 1936, p.176). Unlike behaviorists, gestalt psychologists focused on the organization of cognitive processes rather than on stimulus and response. Wertheimer stated the following when defining Gestalt theory and its objectives:

The fundamental “formula” of Gestalt theory might be expressed in this way: there are whole, the behavior of which is not determined by that of their individual elements, but where the part-processes are themselves determined by intrinsic nature of the whole. It is the hope of Gestalt theory to determine the nature of such whole. (Wertheimer,1938/2013,p.2) or (Ellis, 1938, p.2)

Gestalt theorists contended that studying behavior and introspection is necessary for comprehending the phenomenal world around us. Additionally, they believed that studying larger patterns of behavior should coexist with the study of consciousness and mental life in order to achieve genuine psychology. The following section discusses how a holistic perspective on perception paved the way for a critical problem-solving theory known as insight theory. 

In the Berlin School of Experimental Psychology, Gestaltism began as an intellectual curiosity. Carl Stumpf (Lewin, 1937), Max Wertheimer (1938,1959), Kurt Koffka (1936), Wolfgang Köhler (1925,1967), and Kurt Lewin (1936) all contributed to the development of gestaltism into psychology. Gestalt psychologists were primarily concerned with perception. However, Gestaltists expanded their research to encompass a wide range of significant psychological issues, including behavior, psychopathology, cognition, and problem solving. Inspired by Gestalt theory, Wertheimer (1959) argued the importance of pursuing a holistic problem situation to solve a problem. He was opposed to blindly following a learned procedure, referred to as reproductive thinking. Solving a problem using a learned procedure solver demonstrates a lack of understanding of the problem-solving procedure. The problem solver becomes devoid of meaning when confronted with a problem. The solution and interpretation of a problem result from a Gestalt formation, which results in productive thinking. He also emphasized the critical role of context and problem solver, as problem solving entails a person’s personal life, interaction histories, and social aspects (Wertheimer, 1959, p.240). In addition, Wolfgang Köhler established the Gestalt approach to problem solving. Köhler (1925) conducted experiments with chimps to better understand their problem-solving behavior. He published his seminal work on problem solving in The Mentality of Apes (1925). He presented chimps with a variety of practical problems involving difficult-to-reach bananas. Chimpanzees were permitted to play with sticks and boxes as a means of reaching the bananas (Figure 1). He frequently observed chimps attempting but failing and retreating in frustration. Later, they would appear to be doing nothing but suddenly leap up, rush to the sticks, assemble them, and retrieve the bananas. He concluded that, in contrast to behaviorists’ trial and error approach, chimps had insight into the problem while appearing to do nothing. At times, it is beneficial to take a step back, detach from active problem-solving behavior, and incubate the problem. Then there is a possibility of having an insight experience, or what is sometimes referred to as an aha-experience, or illumination.

Figure 1 Köhler’s (2011) chimpanzees performing various problem solving tasks. (The above collage has been created from the YouTube video which incorporated  Köhler’ study footage, (Kerwin, 2014)

Karl Duncker, Köhler’s student and later assistant, expanded the scope of Köhler’s work to include human problem solving. Duncker (1945) coined the term “functional fixedness” to refer to an object’s conditional functionality in terms of ease or difficulty as a measure of the object’s “fixedness” (p.85). Duncker (1945) operated on the premise that an appropriate object is required for a specific purpose or function. He conducted a series of experiments to determine the effect of pre-utilization. He was interested in an already used object in the same problem situation, but in another way, in another function.

The “box problem” was one of five experiments (for details on the other four problems: the gimlet problem, the pliers problem, the weight problem, and the paperclip problem, see Duncker, 1945) designed to examine the effect of functional fixedness. The box problem (commonly referred to as the candle problem) was a visual experiment in which subjects were instructed to place a candle on the door at eye level. They were each given a standard matchbox, tacks, and a candle. Subjects were instructed to use tacks to construct a matchbox as a platform for the candle as part of the solution (see Figure 2). Ducker (1945) observed that the difficulty in solving the candle problem stems from the fixation on the candle and match box’s assumed functions. The well-known functions of the matchbox create a mental block, preventing subjects from repurposing the objects to solve the problem in novel ways. The experiment demonstrates the difficulty of reconceptualizing an object’s functions when one is familiar with the object’s specific usage or purpose. The difficulty in resolving such problems stems from viewing objects in a problem situation as discrete entities rather than conceptualizing them as a whole in order to solve the problem.

Figure 2 Dunker’s Candle Problem (1945). The subjects are instructed to secure a candle to the wall and are provided with a box of tacks, a candle, and matches, as illustrated in panel A. Panel B illustrates the solution.

The Gestalt concept, which can be summed up by the mantra “the whole is greater than the sum of its parts,” can be applied to perception and problem solving, as Koffka (1936) put it, “we could not solve any organizational problem by resolving each point separately, one by one; the solution had to come for the whole” (p.176). Koffka characterizes the relationship between problem and solution as one of whole and parts. It is critical to recognize that two previously considered distinct items (for example, two sticks in Köhler’s chimp experiment) must be combined into a single item (by putting them together). Thus, it is a change in representation, or what is sometimes referred to as mental restructuring. Mental restructuring is synonymous with perception. One has the shape’s individual components and can combine them to create something new. Similarly, chimps had to retrieve bananas using individual sticks in conjunction with a long stick. Additionally, in the candle problem, one’s perception of the function of objects must be altered to find the solution.

The Gestalt approach to problem solving emphasizes the importance of representing the problem’s elements. Gestalt psychologists were the first to describe insight, illumination, or a-ha experiences occurring in both animals and humans. However, Gestalt psychologists have been unable to specify the precise mental mechanism underlying restructuring and insight phenomena. Thus, what occurs psychologically? They did not attempt to provide rationales or cognitive mechanisms. Ohlsson (1992) responded to this criticism by emphasizing the Gestalt terminology and vocabulary in his representational change theory. He proposes two major processes for insightful behavior: internal representation of the problem and constraint relaxation. He argues that the inability to solve a problem is primarily due to a failure to grasp the proper representation of the problem. A mistaken representation of the problem creates a mental block that prevents the retrieval of the necessary information from resolving it. According to Ohlsson (1992), insight is nothing more than a representational shift in the mind that enables the retrieval of the necessary information for problem solving.

While Ohlsson’s attempt was an improvement, it fell short of proposing a robust, all-inclusive mechanism for manipulating mental representation. The following section discusses the changes that have occurred in our understanding of the mind and cognition as a result of the cognitive revolution. The cognitive revolution succeeded in presenting a complete theory explaining the mechanism for manipulating representation in mind. Following that, computational and representational understandings of the mind significantly impacted the field and approach to problem solving.

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