Hope, Pandora’s Mixed Bag
Esther Han
Introduction
When Pandora – the girl with the gifts – opened a jar, she released all the ills of mankind. The only thing that remained was the spirit of Hope. Nothing is written about what Hope said to Pandora. One could imagine the spirit offering her commiseration and the hope of redemption. These reassurances would have been bald-faced lies. No human being could make amends for Pandora’s jar. It is unlikely Pandora was ever forgiven by her fellow humans. As for the gods, they were the very beings who had set the jar trap. There was no deus ex machina waiting for her. To encourage Pandora in that moment of complete, identity-defining failure would have been a compassionate act – but also one that encouraged denial. This is Pandora’s mixed legacy: the complex nature of hope, and the ethical implications of encouraging it.
The first mythological case of hope was predicated on devastating human failure. Yet today, hope is often greeted reflexively with encouragement. Nowhere is this more apparent than in response to children’s hopes. There is an unwritten rule that even impossible childhood dreams should be encouraged. Hope is an absolute positive and therefore deserves an absolutely positive response.
I disagree with this view. In many ways, I believe unqualified positivity in response to hope is a form of evasion. Platitudes such as, “You can be anything and anyone you want,” escape the discomfort of engagement with another person’s dream and possibility of failure. While this ethical duty of engagement does not apply to every relationship, it is critical in regards to children. Children lack the experience of their elders to judge falsehood. Thus, encouraging faulty hopes does them no favors. The purpose of this paper is to justify the claim that the encouragement of Stoic acceptance of the dichotomy of control is ethically superior to encouraging hope that contains false beliefs. The rest of the paper will examine hope, Stoic and Epicurean philosophy, and the comparison of hope to Stoic acceptance.
The Analysis of Hope: Stoics and Epicureans
Defining hope is a nuanced task. Its perceived value has fluctuated widely in history. Hellenistic philosophers, most prominently Epicureans and Stoics, held many reservations about hope. Seneca, a renowned Stoic philosopher, connected hope to fear, and advised avoiding both. Like Epicurus, he endorsed the tranquility of the soul (Bloeser and Stahl, 2017). Both the Stoic and Epicurean schools considered a happy life to consist of the absence of passion (respectively, apatheia and ataraxia). Both criticized the beliefs that put human souls in distress. When emotions were natural and necessary, they were acceptable. But when emotions were neither natural nor necessary, they were undesirable. Hope failed the conditions of stability and necessity, and was convicted of being an attitude with “insufficient insight into what is true or good” (Bloeser and Stahl, 2017).
Case Studies and Epicurus
The methodology of Epicurean philosophy can be best understood through application. I will evaluate hope through two case studies of children’s hopes. The first case contains a false belief. Jimmy hopes to receive presents from Santa Claus. The second case does not contain a false belief. Helen hopes to become an astronaut. Both are common hopes in North America. Children’s hopes are frequently viewed as blameless, fundamentally tied to happiness in a way that many adult hopes are not. If children’s hopes can be proven to have structural flaws, it would pose a powerful argument against the unconditional approval of hope.
Epicurus would immediately censure Jimmy’s hope for Santa’s presents. From the start, Jimmy’s desire reflects the artificial values of society. The little boy desires material possessions. His hope has the taint of religion. Epicurus stoutly disbelieved in higher supernatural powers, be they Santa Claus or Zeus. Jimmy’s hope for presents, drawn from the values of a materialistic society and a quasi-religious belief in a false god, would bring disturbances to Jimmy’s soul. “For the causes [of disturbances of the soul] are false beliefs about the world and about value, along with the “empty” desires that are generated by false beliefs” (Nussbaum, 1994, 105). To both the Epicureans and Stoics, disturbances of the soul were seen as the antithesis of happiness. To flourish (eudaimonia) was to be free of emotional upheaval, and the path to freedom was detachment (ataraxia). In Epicurus’ eyes, Jimmy would be a prisoner to his materialistic desires, false beliefs, and torments of emotional fluctuation.
Epicurus’ judgement on the second case would be less severe. Helen’s dream of astronaut-hood would not be based on a false belief. Space travel is possible. However, Epicurus was not a supporter of the sciences. He dedicated his life to the art of living, to a Lebensphilosophie. Why pursue other worlds when philosophy secured the good life on Earth? Epicurus would have held many strong opinions on Elon Musk. Indeed, Epicurus would have had strong words for anyone who placed their hopes in their careers. Those hopes would be based on artificial values of success. Reaching the stars might bring Helen fame, admiration, and financial security. It would not bring relief for the knowledge of her inevitable death. Epicurus valued the latter outcome far more than the former. Thus, Epicurus would judge Helen’s efforts to be better served by studying philosophy.
Most damningly, Helen’s hope would be astronomically difficult. Only 16 Americans are active female NASA astronauts. Epicurus would argue against such a low probability dream. Epicurus advocated for “natural” desires that could be achieved with accessible resources. Healthy desires were easy to satisfy. By contrast, unhealthy desires were directed towards unattainable or nearly unattainable outcomes and characterized by an endless longing (Nussbaum, 1994, 112-113). Helen could devote her entire life to her dream. Her dream would not be easily attainable, nor would it set hard limits on personal sacrifice. Thus, both Helen and Jimmy’s hopes would fail to earn Epicurus’ approval. Jimmy’s hope would fail due to its false beliefs, and Helen’s hope would fail due to its difficulty.
The Cost of Hope
At this point, a counter argument could be made: Why not encourage hope? The Epicurean and Stoic definition of hope is a critical one, and perhaps one out of line with modern thought. Hope inspires action in the face of despair. Hope is a component of child-like wonder, of possibility. Proponents would argue it should be preserved even when it contains false beliefs. The accusation, “Would you tell a child Santa isn’t real?” has become a saying that condemns the target’s moral character. Similarly, it is a national virtue to encourage young women to engage in the sciences and strive for careers that were barred to them in the past. My rebuttal is that hope’s conditions can render its costs higher than its gains. I will deconstruct the conditions of hope, and address how they prolong suffering.
The Analysis of Hope: A Compound Attitude with Conditions
I will adopt the minimalist standard account of hope: Hope requires that the hoper desires the object of hope and lacks the “belief that the outcome is impossible” (Bloeser and Stahl, 2017). Although there is no universally agreed upon definition, I have narrowed hope down to these four conditions:
- Desire for an outcome.
- Belief that the outcome is possible.
- Epistemic uncertainty.
- Independence of probability assessments.
I propose that these conditions are necessary for the compound attitude of hope. Without placing weight on an outcome, or believing that an outcome is possible, hope degenerates into wishful thinking. Furthermore, there must be uncertainty, and an inclusion of hopes which flourish despite unfavorable circumstances. Thus, I argue an account of hope that does not include these conditions is incomplete. These conditions can be applied to the cases of Jimmy and Helen.
In the case of Jimmy the Santa devotee, his desire is to receive presents from a supernatural entity. He believes that this outcome is possible, as justified by previous Christmases and reassurances of Santa’s existence. Jimmy still experiences a twinge of doubt – he may not have been very good this year. He may have heard schoolyard gossip that the fat man does not exist. Nevertheless, he clings to the hope of Christmas day.
Helen’s hope can also be defined as a compound attitude. Her desire is to become an astronaut. She has seen astronauts on television. She has a justified belief that becoming an astronaut is possible. Yet there is uncertainty – Helen has not seen many girls like her in space. She has never met anyone who has walked on the moon. But even as she realizes that astronaut-hood is an unusual profession, she retains her hope independently of her probability assessment.
Both cases can be broken down into the four conditions. It is the combination of Conditions III and IV that transform the encouragement of hope into a thorny ethical proposal.
The third condition is epistemic uncertainty. By epistemic uncertainty, I am referring to the uncertainty whether the desired outcome will ever be realized. If a desired outcome is a known certainty, it is not a hope. If a desired outcome is a known impossibility, it is not a hope. To be a hoper requires a degree of uncertainty.
If a hope is based on a true belief that the outcome is possible, and the outcome is realized, I will refer to it as a true-hope. If a hope is based on a false belief that the outcome is possible, I will refer to it as a false-hope. Moreover, if a hope is possible but never comes to pass, I will also define that hope as a false-hope as it has proven to be unattainable. Therefore, there are 3 hope outcomes:
- The hope is based on the true belief that the outcome is possible. The outcome is realized. This is a true-hope.
- The hope is based on a false belief that the outcome is possible. The outcome is never realized. This is a false-hope.
- The hope is based on a true belief that the outcome is possible. The outcome is never realized. This is a false-hope.
Due to epistemic uncertainty, it is impossible to determine whether a hope is a true-hope or a false-hope until after the hope has been realized. A hope can only be known to be a true-hope after the fact. Thus, to be in the attitude of hope is to be in a state of continuous uncertainty.
This segues to the fourth condition: independence of probability assessments. It is the nature of hope to disregard probability assessments. The one-in-a-million chance is as much a candidate of hope as the one-in-five chance. This, I would argue, is what lends hope its unique character. Optimism changes in proportion to the probability of success. Despair follows suit. But hope does not bear that correlation. Hope does not have to respond to changes in fortune, and can even grow stronger as prospects deteriorate. This disregard for probability assessments is what renders hope a risky proposition.
When Conditions III and IV combine, they create a feedback loop. A hoper may cling to Condition III, epistemic uncertainty, and ignore the low probability of her hope due to Condition IV. Due to Condition IV, independence of probability assessments, she may continue to hold that hope as long as the probability is not zero. Yet the longer she holds onto her hope, the greater the cost grows. There is an opportunity cost. There is an expenditure of time. Most critically, there is no shelf life. A person could throw her life into a dream, sinking tangible and intangible resources on a personal purgatory. Ultimately, there would be a disproportionate expenditure in ratio to return. These points are illustrated in the tale of Odysseus and Penelope.
Odysseus and Penelope
Odysseus, hero of the Trojan War, married Penelope, had a son with her, then sailed away for 20 years. Penelope was left alone to rule Ithaca. During this time, Penelope was suspended in a state of epistemic uncertainty. With each year, the possibility of Odysseus’ return waned. Yet Penelope endured uncertainty and decreasing probability. Her hope was not rewarded with a Disney ending.
Penelope was faithful through the decades. Odysseus was not. His affairs included a princess, a sorceress, and a goddess. Odysseus returned penniless and murderous. He incited a blood feud that was only resolved through the intervention of a literal goddess. It is doubtful that this was the reunion Penelope had been waiting for.
Tragically, the opportunity cost of Penelope’s hope stained its gains. Had Penelope abandoned hope, she could have ruled alone or married a more compassionate co-ruler. She could have avoided the disturbances of the soul that resulted from waiting for a distant partner. Penelope could have moved on from the past and devoted herself to the present. Those around her, aware of her plight, would have ill-served her by encouraging her uncertain hope.
Stoic Acceptance as an Alternative
Instead, those who cared for Penelope should have espoused Stoic acceptance. Stoic acceptance is based on the dichotomy of control. Humans can control their beliefs, values, and judgements. Everything external is beyond them. Wealth, health, the circumstances of one’s birth – none of these are under humanity’s control. Outcomes fall in the category of the external. Stoic acceptance substitutes the pursuit of desired outcomes for a focus on the internal. In essence, it is the acknowledgement of what is and is not controllable, and the acceptance of whatever may come.
Jimmy’s false-hope is a case in which encouraging Stoic acceptance is morally superior to encouraging false-hope. Jimmy subjects himself to emotional lows and highs. His hope for presents submerges him in an empty longing. Like Pandora’s hope for absolution, Jimmy’s hope is based on a lie. Stoic acceptance as a substitute to hope would remove the emotional toll.
In Helen’s case, her story echoes that of Penelope’s. Many external factors are beyond their control. Where the stories diverge is in the determination of whether hope’s gains justify the costs. Helen may never become an astronaut. She will stay in a state of epistemic uncertainty until the realization or sundering of her dream. Even should she realize her dream, she may receive mixed results. If she can accept the possibility of failure, as well as the cost of her hope, then her hope is warranted. Ultimately, it is up to Helen whether her hope is worth holding. Helen’s friends and family should accept her decision while remembering the cautionary tale of Penelope.
Conclusion
My goal in this paper has been to highlight the complex nature of hope. This compound attitude can motivate action in the midst of despair. Yet Pre-Christian, Hellenistic philosophical perspectives veered towards the disapproving. Furthermore, a minimalist standard account underscores that hope can trap hopers in an endless stasis, where the costs outweigh the gains. Even childhood dreams can fall into these pitfalls. In conclusion, hopes should be examined regularly as to whether they should be kept, abandoned, or encouraged.
References
Bloeser, Claudia and Titus Stahl, “Hope”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/hope/>.
Ferrarello, Susi, director. Massimo Pigliucci on “What Stoicism Can Do for Our Lives”. YouTube, 16 Nov. 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pipbrJKeo-0. Accessed 7 Sept. 2021.
Nussbaum, Martha Craven. The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics. Princeton Univ. Press, 1994.
Sarzano, Melanie. “Costly False Beliefs: What Self-Deception and Pragmatic Encroachment Can Tell Us about the Rationality of Beliefs.” Dossier: On Self-Deception, vol. 13, no. 2, 2019, pp. 95–118., https://doi.org/10.7202/1059501ar.
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