On Grice’s Implicature
Alecx Kyle Sabater
Formal logic systems have been criticized by Paul Grice for oversimplifying propositions and arguments, reducing them to a state that disregards the value found in the implications, the nuances that themselves could have led one to form a more whole understanding. While a valid criticism, it assumes that the implicature itself is intrinsically supplemental to understanding whatever topic is at hand. But such an attitude would dismiss the possibility that implicature exists at varying grades of quality and face the problem of accurate reception. So while it is right that formal logic structures can reduce these propositions and arguments to a state far removed from the context they were conceived from, the task of determining the quality of implicature makes itself apparent.
When discussing the shortcomings of formal logic systems, one cannot help but look to Grice’s work (1991). The very construction of the maxims he is known for is, at heart, a response to the faults he perceived in formal logic systems–at least, in how they were used in his time. Such systems were functionally meant to access the most “important” part of logical analyses: truth values. Its importance was really to be found in that it was the only quality people would care to evaluate. You “win” if it all comes out to be true, and you “lose” if it comes out to be false. Even with the prevalence of this sort of attitude in many’s approaches to argumentative evaluation now, many others would find that what we generally understand to be better strategies have steered away from looking to logical truths and falsities alone. And this shift can largely be attributed to Grice.
In the face of the issues present in the overfixation of truth values in formal logic systems, Grice asserted that there need be a place for the informal counterpart to the formal as there is much that can be communicated in natural language on its own (Grice, 1991, pp. 23-24). In making a sort of “home” for informalcy, one can direct their attention to what people are communicating through what they imply; inquiring into the valuable content that lies beneath the surface of plain sayings.
To clarify, it is not as though Grice were suggesting that we abandon analysis through the means of formal logic. He is merely working to establish the significance of the informal structures that were brushed aside at the time. Doing so does not diminish the value of formal logic systems as a tool to its own ends. That being said, formal logic should not be seen as a means to access some end all, be all truth value but rather, as a tool to be utilized in systematically assessing language. Grice’s implicature offers itself to be the colloquial, in the literal sense, counterpart to that which is formal, specialized.
Returning to Grice’s implicatures, while there is no doubt that that which may be inferred from colloquial language is of great significance, we might find ourselves wanting to take things a step further: How do we evaluate what can be inferred? Formal logic is itself a tool used in the evaluation of, well, formally structured propositions and arguments; and what of the informal? By what standards do we analyze what is not plainly said? Accurately inferring meaning from that which is obscured in its very nature is no easy task. Perhaps the answer lies within how informal propositions are presented and the conceivable possibilities that are permitted through its very methods.
If we are to look for means to evaluate implicature, it would do good to first examine events in which implications are misconstrued. Often, people are subject to problems that arise out of misunderstandings. It seems to be an inescapable component of regular human interaction, that the methods we employ in how we communicate with natural language can fail to convey our intentions. Instances like this can be thought of as an example of poor implicature in that there exists a great likelihood that the speaker can be misunderstood. The evaluation of not the content of the implicature, but the inability of the speaker’s methods to communicate their message is a measure of poorness in their use of implacture. Implications appear to be naturally intertwined with obscuration, but it would not be rational to assume that they need to be completely concealed. It would defeat what implications represent conceptually: the intentional communication of ideas through an indirect means of delivery.
Having established what poor implicature is characterized by, we can move on to describing the qualities of a more ideal state. Given that the distinguishing quality of poor, of unideal implicature is the inability to communicate intended ideas, it follows that defining characteristics of the ideal are inversely characterized by communicative clarity. This would be exemplified in events where the speaker’s ideas are not misunderstood, when the listener(s) understanding is in accordance to what was intended. It can also be exemplified in a “lower” sort of grade if the listener(s) in question arrive at an understanding in line with the speaker’s intentions, but is not exactly what was intended for them to know.
This brings us to view qualitative evaluation of implicature is one that follows a gradient scale, one that measures implicature’s (as individual instances) proximity to misunderstanding and complete understanding; if it occupies a space closer to one or the other. Implicature’s place in this evaluation system is completely dependent on context, which itself does not only extend itself to the situational sense but goes as far as to include who the speaker is and who is listening. To evaluate by the measures of this scale is to look to 1. The speaker’s intentions as to what they wish to communicate indirectly 2. If the listener(s) in the instance came to understand it with complete accuracy. If the listener fails to arrive at a complete understanding of what the speaker attempted to communicate, one would have to determine what place said understanding would inhabit on our scale; if it lies in complete misinterpretation or if it comes closer to the speaker’s intentions. Any situation that results in anything less than complete understanding of the speaker is indicative of some degree of failure in the methods employed in the speaker’s implying, its magnitude to be understood by our measure.
And so this is our tentative measurement scale for qualitative evaluation of implicature. Without a doubt, it is necessary to recognize the significance implications and their place in use of regular language. And they need be subject to evaluations in order to determine the quality in the communicative methods employed and the value they may contribute to interactions through use of natural language. Without so, we would be without much means to determine the nature of the value they contribute to the individual instances implicature are utilized.
References
Grice, H. (1991). Studies in the way of words. Harvard University Press.
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